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SAME-SEX MARRIAGES IN NEW YORK:

THE LANGAN AND HERNANDEZ DECISIONS
BY ANN XIN ZHU

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

Same-sex marriage is a heightened issue in the legislative
and judicial system in New York. For a brief period, between
2003 and early 2005, the Supreme Court of New York held that
same-sex marriages in New York were constitutional. However,
the atmosphere in New York State's judicial system quickly
changed near the end of 2005. In 2003, the Supreme Court of New
York in Nassau County had held in Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp.,1
that a surviving spouse has standing to bring an action for the
wrongful death and medical malpractice of the deceased spouse of
the same-sex. John Langan and the decedent had entered into a
civil union in Vermont in November 2000. The court recognized
that "[w]ith respect to marriages entered into in sister states, New
York adheres to the general rule that marriage contracts, valid
where made, are valid everywhere, unless contrary to natural laws
or statutes." 2 New York, adhering to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, recognizes a marriage commenced legally in another state
so long as it is performed properly.3 Therefore, the court in
Langan recognized that the surviving spouse had standing because
his marriage to the deceased was legally performed in Vermont.
Legality of same-sex marriages experienced further success
in 2005 with Hernandez v. Robles,4 when the Supreme Court of
New York in New York County held that same-sex couples could
not be denied from entering into a civil union in New York. The
'Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 2003), rev'd, 802
N.Y.S.2d
476 (App. Div. 2005), appeal dismissed, 6 N.Y.3d 890 (2006).
2
Id. at 443.
3 K. v. K., 393 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Fam. Ct. 1977).
4 Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 2005), rev'd, 805 N.Y.S.2d
354 (App. Div. 2005), aff'd 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL.

Vol. XIV

court explicitly stated "[t]he [New York Domestic Relations Law]
does not expressly bar same-sex marriage."5 This is support by the
fact that 'jural marriage' is defined "without any reference to the
sex of the parties to a marriage.",6 The State's law did not
explicitly preclude same-sex marriages. As a result, the court
extended the meaning of 'spouse,' 'husband,' 'wife,' 'bride,' and
'groom' to either male or female and all personal pronouns were
construed to apply equally to either men or women.
In both the Langan and Hernandez opinions, the courts had
justified their ruling that same-sex marriage was constitutional
because the laws of New York State do not preclude such right.
Same-sex marriage continues to be a controversial and political
issue in America's society. However, when the issue enters the
judicial court system, the parties have the right to expect that
decisions are made free from any form of political motivation. The
judges that decided Langan and the Hernandez reinforced this
notion by analyzing a legal issue with the current laws. The
greatest success in these cases was not so much the decisions
themselves, but the reasoning supported in each decision.
LANGAN V. ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL: AT THE APPELLATE
DIVISION

The success of Langan and Hernandez were short lived
because the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
Second Department reversed the decisions on appeal in both cases.
In October 2005, the appellate court reversed Langan, holding that
the surviving spouse could not bring a wrongful death action
against the hospital. The appellate court in Langan held that the
wrongful death statute in New York's Estate, Powers and Trusts
Law (EPTL) that allowed "the personal representative, duly
appointed in [New York] state or any other jurisdiction, of a
decedent...[to] maintain an action to recover damages for wrongful

5Id.at 588.
6 Id.; See also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10 (1999).
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act, neglect or default which caused the decedent's death,"7 did not
include same-sex surviving spouses. 8
LACK OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO EXCLUDE SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES

The court's holding, however, is based on feeble reasoning
and lack of precedent. First, the court reasoning stated that "the
thought that the surviving spouse would be of the same sex as the
decedent was simply inconceivable and certainly there was no
discriminatory intent to deny the benefits of the statute to a
directed class."9 However, the court does not provide any
reference to any language in the statute or legislative comments on
the statute that confirms such negative intent. The court's
reasoning leaves open whether or not it was the legislative intent to
exclude same-sex surviving spouses from New York's wrongful
death statute. By providing vague references, it is questionable
whether the "thought that a surviving spouse cannot be of the
same-sex as the decedent"'" is the thought of the judge's alone.
NOT ALL LAWS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL

Second, the court reasoned that "[1]ike all laws enacted by
the people through their elected representatives, EPTL 5-4.1 is
entitled to a strong presumption that it is constitutional."" The
court was referring to past United States Supreme Court cases
containing issues regarding laws passed by elected representatives
or the voters themselves. 2 But is it really true that all laws passed
by a group of elected representatives or voters are constitutional?
History and precedent have proved that reasoning to the contrary.
Majority vote does not always constitute constitutional judgment.
The basis of the checks and balances system between the
7N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (1999).

8 See Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
9Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
1°Id.
l"Id.
12Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
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legislature and the judicial courts is to ensure that the branch of
government, the legislature, that passes the laws does not review
the laws which it creates. To grant such a strong assumption that
all laws passed by elected representatives are constitutional,
without judicial review, goes against the whole purpose of the
judicial system.
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION

Third, the court does not sufficiently base its holding on
case precedent. The court selects part of the holding in Romer v.
Evans 3 but ignores other holdings that are relevant to the issue in
Langan. The court attempts to support the constitutionality of the
statute by its reference to Romer that "[i]n order to survive
constitutional scrutiny a law needs only to have a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest even if the law appears
unwise or works to the detriment of one group or the other."' 4 The
court stated that since it did not meet the burden under Romer, the
law was constitutional when applied to same-sex surviving
spouses. "
The court, however, failed to cite a very significant holding
in Romer that, if applied, would have been favorable in Langan.
Romer held that "[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more
difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid
from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense.' 16 If EPTL 5-4.1 was interpreted
based on Romer's reasoning in the context of same-sex marriages,
clearly the law would make it more difficult for any same-sex
surviving spouse to seek aids from the government by way of
having standing to bring an action against a negligent party. EPTL
5-4.1 would result in a denial of equal protection by not only
making it more difficult, but by completely barring the surviving
spouse in Langan from bringing a wrongful death action against
the hospital.
13Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

14 Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
15 Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
16

Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-634.
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No DISTINCTION BETWEEN MARRIAGE AND CIVIL UNION
Lastly, the Langan court leaves open whether same-sex
couples married in Massachusetts, instead of having a civil union
in Vermont, would have resulted in a different decision since
"Massachusetts has judicially created such rights for its citizens" 7
to bring wrongful death suits.
The court does not answer that
question; instead, it attempts to make a distinction between
'marriage' and 'civil union' that leads to no real distinction other
than in the name. 8
"Same-sex couples who marry [in Massachusetts] are
entitled to the benefits that Massachusetts extends to married
couples."' 9 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had held
that "[l]imiting the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the basic premises of
individual liberty and equality under law protected by the
Massachusetts Constitution."2 Similarly, Vermont affords that all
same-sex spouses shall "have all the same benefits, protection and
responsibilities under [Vermont] law.. .as are granted to spouses in
a marriage."'" Although Vermont does not use the term 'civil
union' interchangeably with 'marriage,' there is clearly no
substantive distinction between the benefits and protections in a
marriage and in a civil union. The only difference is in the name.
HERNANDEZ V. ROBLES: AT THE APPELLATE DIVISION

Two months after the Appellate Division's decision in
Langan, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
First Department reversed Hernandez, holding that the Domestic
Relations Law provisions do not permit same-sex marriages and do
17 Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
18

See Derek B. Dom, Same-Sex Marriage Under New York Law - Advising

Clients in a State of Uncertainty, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 2006, at 43, available at

http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Publications 19/BarJournal/Bar
Journal Archive/2006_Archive/journaljanuary_06_dorn.pdf.
20

id at 4-1.
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003); see

also 78-Jan N.Y. St. B.J. 40 (Jan. 2006).
21 See VT. STAT. ANN. TIT 15 § 1204(a) (2006).
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not violate due process or equal protection by its exclusion.22 The
appellate court in Hernandez focused on the fact that it is not the
judiciary's role to regulate marriage and that it is against public
policy to allow same-sex marriages because the state has an
interest in maintaining procreation, child welfare, and social
stability.23
The court's rationalization is highly problematic. First, the
court's judicial review avoids the primary issue, whether same-sex
marriage in New York is constitutional. Second, the court based
its reasoning on stereotypes and acts as a political commentator
rather than a judge held with the duty of making impartial
decisions.
JUDICIAL REVIEW

It is possible to conclude that any court decision may result
in changes to the legislative position of the contested law.
However, the intent was never to have the court regulate marriage.
The court was to review a contested law passed by the legislature,
in order to determine whether the law was constitutional. The
court erred in concluding that a review of the law is equivalent to
regulating the law. The law is for judicial review and only the
legislature can adopt laws based on the court's opinion. If the
court determines that the law is unconstitutional, it is up to the
legislature to make amendments based on the court's opinion or to
abolish the law. However, the court first has the duty to determine
whether the current state statute and the state constitution,
precludes same-sex marriage.
PUBLIC POLICY

The court in Hernandez based its decision on a number of
'public policy factors' for rejecting same-sex marriage:
procreation, child welfare, and social stability. The court's
assumption and biases of same-sex marriage was best contradicted
in Baker v. State, decided by the Supreme Court of Vermont court
22

Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 2005).

23

Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
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holding civil unions between same-sex couples as constitutional.24
Unlike Baker, that supported its decisions using facts regarding
procreation, child welfare, and social stability, the court in
Hernandez provides no factual support for its conclusions.
Without providing facts to support its 'public policy factors,' the
court is overstepping its duty by injecting, what may be concluded
as, personal or political views of the issue. Such views are unfit in
a judicial decision and its presence disintegrates the integrity of
judicial decision-making.
PROCREATION, ADOPTION AND ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION

The court does not provide factual support but that does not
mean there are no facts to support a public policy rationale for or
against same-sex marriage.
The court's first factor was
procreation; that procreation is between opposite-sex couples.
Many couples, whether opposite or same-sex, have artificial
insemination and/or adopt; neither of which is illegal, and the latter
is desired and encouraged by the state because of the growing
number of children that are not adopted. 5 The court also assumes
that traditionally married couples want children. In addition,
procreation is not always a result of marriage and in today's
society, "children are being born to single-sex families on a
biological basis, and that they are being so born in considerable
numbers."26
NEGATIVE CHILD WELFARE RESULTING FROM TRADITIONAL
MARRIAGES

The court's second factor is that a child's welfare is better
maintained in traditional marriages than in same-sex marriage.
24
25

Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
See generally Adoption Frequently Asked Questions, NYS Office of Children

and
Family
Services,
available
at
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/adopt/adoptfaq.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
26 Baker, 744 A.2d at 881, citing E. Shapiro & L. Schultz, Single-Sex Families:
The Impact of Birth Innovations Upon TraditionalFamily Notions, 24 J. FAM. L.

271,281 (1985).
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The court's assumptions are unsupported by any factual basis and
its reasoning is highly stereotypical in that:
"Marriage promotes sharing of resources between
men, women and the children that they procreate;
provides a basis for the legal and factual assumption
that a man is the father of his wife's child via the
legal presumption of paternity plus the marital
expectations of monogamy and fidelity; and creates
and develops a relationship between parents and
child based on real, everyday ties. It is based on the
presumption that the optimal situation for child
rearing is having both biological parents present in a
committed, socially esteemed relationship."27
There are many faults with the court's reasoning. First, as
mentioned earlier, the court assumes that if a married couple has a
child, it would be a child that they have procreated failing to take
into consideration adoption or artificial insemination. Second, the
court assumes that traditional marriages result in monogamy and
fidelity, obviously implying that same-sex couples undoubtedly
practice polygamy and infidelity. Like the appellate court in
Langan, the appellate court in Hernandez fails to cite any facts to
support of its conclusion. A statistic that the court does not cite
include the divorce rate for opposite-sex couples, which in 2004,
was 37% in America.2 8 This rate clearly does not include
separation rates for opposite-sex couples, which would increase the
over-all rate of unsuccessful traditional marriages. These rates are
significant because divorce and separation usually have a severely
negative impact on a child's welfare, most significantly the feeling
of rejection from the child's parents.29 Considering these facts,
27Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
28

Americans

for

Divorce

Reform:

Divorce

Rates,

available at

http://www.divorcereform.org/rates.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
29 Patrick F. Fagan, The Social Scientific Data on the Impact of Marriage and
available at
Foundation,
Heritage
Children, The
Divorce on
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/tst051304a.cfm (last visited Apr. 26,
2006).
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there is no indication that traditional marriages are likely to result
in an optimal situation for child rearing, as was implied by the
court.
SOCIAL STABILITY Is NOT BASED ON TRADITIONAL MARRIAGES

The court's last factor is that traditional marriages would
result in social stability. The court assumes that pulling together
the procreation and child rearing factors would result in a stable
society by reasoning that the Domestic Relations Law:
"sets up heterosexual marriage as the cultural, social
and legal ideal in an effort to discourage unmarried
childbearing and to encourage sufficient marital
childbearing to sustain the population and society;
the entire society, even those who do not marry,
depend on a healthy marriage culture for this latter,
critical, but presently undervalued, benefit.
Marriage laws are not primarily about adult needs
for official recognition and support, but about the
well-being of children and society, and such
preference constitutes a rational policy decision.
Thus, society and government have reasonable,
important interests in encouraging heterosexual
couples to accept the recognition and regulation of
marriage.""
The court assumes that the well-being of society is
dependent on traditional marriages. In addition to the faulty
reasoning mentioned earlier, the court does not have and does not
cite any factual basis for its implication that same-sex marriages
would lead to a broken society. Traditional marriages are not
necessary for the well-being of a child nor is there any support that
it is necessary for society. Many people get married for its official
recognition and for its benefits, such as a lower taxable income by
filing joint tax returns and the exclusion of gain from the sale of a
3 0

Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
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primary residence.3" The benefits alone may be sufficient for some
to get married since there is an estimate of "1,138 federal statutory
provisions classified to the United States Code in which marital
status is a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and
privileges."32
CONCLUSION

Progressive issues faced by the courts in both the Langan
and Hernandez cases require careful consideration in decisionmaking. However, the appellate courts' decisions in both cases
reflect the continuously changing nature of judicial decisionmaking. Their decisions reinforce a judge's ability to make
decisions, to draw the line between what is, and is not,
constitutional, and then to walk away without providing the parties
or the public with substantive reasoning. Society has faith in the
judicial system, not because a judge states what he believes is right
or wrong, but because he believes it is right based on facts and an
in-depth analysis of the law. It is reasoning which society looks
upon and which creditability in the law is shaped.

31
32

See generally 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2000).
Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Associate General Counsel, Government

Accounting Office, to The Honorable Bill Frist, United States Senate (Jan. 23,
2004).

